# Aegis — Enterprise Technical Review

**Date:** 2026-04-08  
**Reviewer:** GitHub Copilot (Claude Sonnet 4.6)  
**Version reviewed:** current `develop` HEAD  
**Scope:** Full codebase — `src/`, `dashboard/`, `docs/`, `.github/workflows/`  
(`.tmp/`, `node_modules/`, `dist/` excluded)

---

## Executive Summary

Aegis is a well-structured Fastify/tmux HTTP bridge for orchestrating Claude Code sessions. It has solid fundamentals: typed contracts, atomic disk writes, a capable SSE event system, a circuit-breaker webhook layer, comprehensive test quantity, and meaningful CI/CD. The codebase is production-ready for **single-user or small-team deployments on a single machine**.

It is **not yet enterprise-ready**. The following critical gaps stand between current state and enterprise deployment:

| Tier | Theme | Blockers |
|------|-------|----------|
| 🔴 Critical | Identity & Access | No RBAC, no session ownership, no SSO/OIDC |
| 🔴 Critical | Tenancy | All sessions globally visible to all API keys |
| 🔴 Critical | Audit | No immutable audit trail for compliance (SOC2/ISO 27001) |
| 🟠 High | Security | `env` injection, `claudeCommand` RCE surface, prompt injection |
| 🟠 High | Scalability | Single-node, in-memory state, no persistence for orchestration state |
| 🟠 High | Observability | No Prometheus endpoint, no distributed tracing, no structured alerting |
| 🟡 Medium | Reliability | Session monitoring can go silent |
| 🟡 Medium | API | No OpenAPI spec, no versioning, no client SDK |

**Total identified findings:** 80+  
**Critical findings:** 6  
**High findings:** 28  
**Medium findings:** 29  
**Low findings:** 17+

---

## Report Index

| Document | Scope | Key Findings |
|----------|-------|-------------|
| [01 — Architecture](./01-architecture.md) | Session lifecycle, concurrency, pipeline, config, scalability | 35 findings across 8 areas |
| [02 — Security](./02-security.md) | Auth, AUTHZ, OWASP Top 10, injection, secrets, permissions | 29 findings; 5 HIGH |
| [03 — Testing & Observability](./03-testing-observability.md) | CI/CD, coverage, metrics, logging, error handling, transcript | 20 findings |
| [04 — MCP, Dashboard & Integrations](./04-mcp-integrations.md) | MCP tools, API contracts, dashboard, WebSocket, channels | 22 findings |
| [05 — Enterprise Gap Roadmap](./05-enterprise-roadmap.md) | Prioritised backlog to reach enterprise grade | All findings mapped to milestones |
| [06 — Disaster Recovery Runbook](./06-disaster-recovery.md) | Backup, audit export, key recovery, restore procedures (#1950) | 4 disaster scenarios, cron automation |
| [00 — Gap Analysis (2026-04-16 follow-up)](./00-gap-analysis.md) | Updated P0/P1/P2 scorecard, 3-phase roadmap, ADR links | P0 ×8, P1 ×10, P2 ×12 |

---

## Overall Architecture Verdict

```
Component           Quality     Enterprise Gap
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
HTTP API (server.ts) GOOD        God-file (2300 lines); configurable limits needed
Session lifecycle    GOOD        Isolation gaps with same-workDir sessions
Concurrency control  ADEQUATE    In-memory races; no distributed lock
Pipeline             ADEQUATE    No persistence, no stage timeout
Consensus            POOR        Hollow implementation; always "running"
Auth                 GOOD        No expiry, no RBAC, no SSO
Permission system    GOOD        Symlink bypass, heuristic fragility
Metrics              ADEQUATE    No Prometheus, hardcoded 0 for duration
Logging              ADEQUATE    No correlation IDs, no shipping
Testing              ADEQUATE    50% threshold too low; "integration" tests aren't
CI/CD                GOOD        CodeQL missing on develop; Windows-only partial
MCP server           ADEQUATE    No tool scoping, prompt injection in prompts
Dashboard            ADEQUATE    No login page, no RBAC view, no audit UI
Notifications        LIMITED     Only Telegram + webhook; no Slack/email/PD
```

---

## Immediate Actions (No PR Required — Configuration)

1. Bind Aegis to `127.0.0.1` only, not `0.0.0.0`, in all deployments lacking reverse-proxy auth.
2. Set `AEGIS_AUTH_TOKEN` even for single-user development — the no-auth mode is a footgun.
3. Rotate any long-lived API keys now; no expiry exists so any leaked key remains valid permanently.
4. Add `secret=` to Fastify's URL redaction list before any log shipping is enabled.

---

## Quick Stats

| Metric | Value |
|--------|-------|
| Source modules (`src/*.ts`) | ~50 |
| Test files (`src/__tests__/`) | ~130 |
| Coverage threshold | 50% lines only |
| CI workflows | 13 |
| MCP tools | 24 |
| API endpoints (`/v1/`) | 50+ |
| AEGIS_* environment variables | 17 documented + 4 undocumented |
| Open GitHub issues (known) | #660, #880–887, and others |